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The State of Maine
and the New Navy, 1889-1893

by
Donald A. Yerxa

When Benjamin Harrison became President in March
of 1889, an effective American naval arm was virtually
nonexistent. The bulk of the ships of the United States
Navy were antiquated, wooden-hulled cruisers. In light
of the rapid advances in naval technology of the 1870s
and 1880s, they were woefully obsolete. The Chester A.
Arthur and Grover Cleveland administrations of the
1880s had taken hesitant steps toward the creation of a
modern steel navy. But the New Navy did not actually
get under way until the Harrison administration of
1889-1893.
The years of the Harrison administration witnessed a
genuine naval renaissance. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s philo
sophy of sea power was popularized in his The Influ
ence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published in
1890. Newspapers, popular magazines, and specialized
naval journals printed a great volume of literature, most
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of which focused on the need for a modernized navy.
Many seaport newspaper editors, legislators from coastal
states, and naval experts claimed that expanding Ameri
can commercial activity as well as the nation’s coastal cit
ies demanded naval protection and that the existing na
val forces definitely were unable to supply adequate de
fense. Responding to the validity and popularity of these
arguments, Congress passed appropriation legislation
which funded the construction of four battleships, three
cruisers, five gunboats, and one ram vessel.
The State of Maine played a major role in the so-called
naval renaissance of the early 1890s. Maine’s Congression
al delegation not only voted consistently for the cause of
the New Navy, but two of its members, Senator Eugene
Hale and Congressman Charles Boutelle, also successful
ly steered the administration’s naval appropriations bills
through Congress. Maine’s only steel shipbuilding plant,
the newly-founded Bath Iron Works, built three of the
New Navy’s vessels during this administration. In addi
tion, the state’s major newspapers added their support to
the creation of a strong naval force in repeated editor
ials. Indeed, Maine’s role in advocacy and even in actual
construction was an important factor in the creation of
the modern United States Navy.

Congressional Activity
There was a general interest in naval policy attendant
upon the Republican return to power in 1889. Republi
cans by tradition and association were pro-Navy, and
Benjamin Harrison was no exception. He was an outspo
ken advocate of a regenerated navy.1 President Harrison
selected an able Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Tracy,
who was to be most influential in furthering the New
Navy cause. Harrison and Tracy had the benefit of clear
Republican majorities in both branches of the Fifty-first
Congress. Although the party’s House majority was
small, it was under the firm hand of the Speaker,
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Thomas B. Reed of Portland, Maine, who throughout the
1880s had been a consistent advocate of naval expan
sion.2 In addition to Republican Congressional majorities,
the return of Augusta, Maine’s James G. Blaine as Secre
tary of State was an indirect boon to the New Navy.
Blaine’s aggressive foreign policy pronouncements, espec
ially his denunciation of European control of the pro
posed inter-isthmian canal, focused public attention on
the divergence of American and European interests.
Blaine’s pronouncements also encouraged imperious de
mands for a navy to put teeth into national policies, no
tably the Monroe Doctrine.3

Maine’s all-Republican Congressional delegation was a
bulwark of support for the administration’s naval policy.
Both Senators William Frye of Lewiston and Eugene
Hale of Turner, the second ranking member of the Sen
ate Naval Affairs Committee, voted consistently to
strengthen and modernize the Navy. Of Maine’s four
Representatives, three likewise were steady friends of
the New Navy policy. Joining Speaker Reed in voting
regularly for a big navy was Nelson Dingley of Durham,
a member of the newly-created Committee of Merchant
Marine and Fisheries. Charles Boutelle of Bangor, Chair
man of the House Naval Affairs Committee in the Fif
ty-first Congress and ranking minority committeeman in
the Fifty-second, was probably the most vocal advocate
of naval expansion in the House. The fourth Representa
tive, Seth Milliken of Montville, was invariably absent
from crucial naval votes, though on one occasion he chal
lenged the anti-New Navy remarks of an Indiana Con
gressman.4 In short, the Maine Congressional delegation
was a solid supporter of the New Navy cause.
Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle in particular
were key figures in the rise of the New Navy. Both men
were well qualified for their important committee posts.
Hale had declined the Navy portfolio in the Hayes ad
ministration but had remained actively involved in naval
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affairs. Boutelle, a shipmaster in his earlier years, was a
captain in the U.S. Navy during the Civil War, participat
ing in the capture of Mobile and commanding naval
forces in the Mississippi Sound.5 With their skillful com
mittee work, forceful arguments, and passionate debate,
Hale and Boutelle successfully steered the Naval Appro
priations Bill of 1890, the first ‘battleship bill’ in the na
tion s history, through Congress. In authorizing “three sea
going coast-line battleships of about 8,500 tons displace
ment” the Bill set the United States upon the alluring
path of sea power and provided a naval basis for the ag
gressive foreign policy of the 1890s.6 In view of the im
portance of this piece of legislation and of the vital role
that Hale and Boutelle played in its passage, the events
leading to and the actual Congressional debates on this
bill require detailed analysis.

Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy’s first annual re
port given in December of 1889 was the first real step to
ward the creation of a modem battleship navy. In the re
port Tracy outlined a “defensive” naval policy. Tradition
ally that meant fast cruiser squadrons for purposes of
commerce raiding. But the Secretary proposed a quite
different navy, one with, in contemporary jargon, a de
terrent first-strike capability. Tracy called for the crea
tion of two battlefield fleets, an Atlantic fleet consisting
of twelve battleships and Pacific fleet of eight. In addi
tion he requested sixty fast cruisers to be used in a
guerre de course (or commerce warfare) strategy and
twenty monitor-type vessels for coast defense.7 The Sec
retary of the Navy worked closely with Senator Hale in
preparing this report, hoping that the Maine legislator’s
influence would lead to rapid Congressional action. To
implement such a far-reaching and inherently long-range
policy, Tracy asked Congress for an immediate start on
eight battleships (which represented his estimate of avail
able shipyard capacity) as well as five torpedo boats and
a continuation of the cruiser-building program.8
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Tracys annual report was soon followed by an even
more remarkable document, the report of the Naval Pol
icy Board. An ad hoc committee of six naval officers had
been appointed by Tracy to study the nation’s naval re
quirements. Taking a broad view of its commission, the
Board outlined a program that suited a Mahanian con
cept of sea power but was by no means practical in
terms of current requirements.9 Like many other investi
gators, the Board considered the existing naval establish
ment totally inadequate. “Our navy is insignificant,” it as
serted, “and totally disproportionate to the greatness of
the country and to the task which would certainly fall to
it in case of war.”10 Yet unlike others, the Board con
sidered a massive naval construction program as the only
remedy. It recommended an incredible 200 ships: 40 bat
tleships, 40 cruisers, 117 torpedo craft, and 11 rams.

Completely ignoring potential international repercus
sions as well as domestic political realities, the Navy Pol
icy Boards report was soundly denounced by both
friends and foes of the New Navy. Senator Hale, for ex
ample, responded to a critic’s remarks that associated
New Navy legislation with the Board’s report.
The officers of that board were able and competent and skillful men
in their profession, but they were seized and possessed with the idea
that the one thing for the American government to do was to build
up an enormous navy equal to that of the nations of the Old World.
Nobody else that I know of is in favor of that.11

As a result of the Board’s startling report, a fear of un
restrained navalism gripped Congress, obviously the re
verse effect from that intended by Tracy. The Naval Af
fairs committees promptly cut the Navy Secretary’s origi
nal proposal down to three coastal battleships, one cruis
er, and a torpedo boat. Because of the cost factor in
volved, even this comparatively modest bill faced consid
erable opposition. The three battleships proposed in the
187

Naval Appropriations Bill of 1890 were estimated to cost
about four million dollars each, nearly treble the amount
earmarked for new naval construction during the preced
ing year and roughly equal to the amount allocated for
new construction for the years 1883 through 1888.12
There was, therfore, considerable debate in Congress on
this piece of legislation. And during the extended debate
Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle successfully
championed the New Navy’s cause and, thereby, helped
to secure passage of the first battleship legislation in the
nation’s history.13
Although much of the discussion on the Naval Appro
priations Bill focused on matters of naval technology
(e.g., cruising ranges, gunnery, and naval architecture),
Senator Hale became involved in debating the basic
questions of the necessity for a modern navy. Referring
to America’s potential power as a sufficient deterrent to
war, Senator Francis Marion Cockrell, a Missouri Demo
crat, viewed a naval renaissance as totally unnecessary.
Maine’s Hale countered this argument by noting that
only an actual naval force (similar to the Mahanian con
cept of a “fleet in being”) would act as a deterrent and
preventive to war. Mere undeveloped potential, Hale
contended, was only a temptation:
Give the small man the pistol, the rifle, the bowie knife and he will at
tack the large man, if he knows that the large man has not weapons
and he wants to do him mischief; but arm the large man, the peaceful
man, the quiet man, with the same weapons the other man has, and
there will never be a step toward a conflict. The two men will live to
gether in antagonism, it may be quarrel all their lives, but there will
be no breach of peace.lif

The Senator often repeated this theme of naval prepared
ness as a deterrent to war. America in a state of unpre
paredness only invited belligerence from the stronger
powers.15

Most of the Congressional debate on the naval bill,
however, did not focus on the need for the New Navy.
Only a few legislators opposed the general notion of
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strengthening and modernizing the country’s naval arm.
But no real consensus existed as to the pace, method, or
procedure of the proposed naval regeneration. Many
Democrats favored the small-navy tradition of Jefferson
and Jackson.16 Even more Congressmen were oriented in
the traditional continentalist naval policy of coast de
fense and commerce warfare. They questioned spending
millions on limited range battleships when, in their esti
mation, money could be spent more wisely on swift
cruisers and shore defenses. As a result of this diver
gence of opinion, Hale and Boutelle spent most of their
time attempting to demonstrate the necessity for battle
ship construction.

Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle effectively de
fended battleship construction. The Maine Senator pic
tured America in 1890 as being at the proverbial cross
roads. The nation had the choice of continuing to build
only cruisers and gunboats or of constructing genuine
“fighting ships”. Should the United States, queried Hale,
be without a single ship capable of maintaining and de
fending its rights at home and abroad?17 He argued that
the nation did not need cruisers or gunboats but battle
ships. Only a battleship could break a blockade of the
coastlines. A blockade, the Senator contended, “would
press with its tremendous congesting force upon every
State in this Union”. In the event of such a state of af
fairs any legislator who opposed battleship bills might as
well “call on the rocks and mountains to hide them from
the indignation of the American people.”18 Boutelle
stated that battleships were an imperative for enabling a
modern navy to resist “aggression when it comes in its
most formidable shape.” Only a battleship could encoun
ter successfully anything that rival powers could send
against the country.19 The Bangor Congressman admitted
that the Navy’s cruisers had the capability of wreaking
considerable havoc with the commerce of European
powers, especially that of Great Britain. But, he added,
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What a spectacle, I say, we should present in chasing English mer
chantmen on the Pacific and South Atlantic and having half a dozen
British ironclads anchored in New York harbor and in the other great
ports in our coast, placing an embargo on the centers of business of
our country and perhaps repeating the destruction of the national
Capital itself.20

America’s first step toward sea power, the Naval Ap
propriations Bill of 1890, passed both the House and Sen
ate with votes of 131 to 105 and 33 to 18, respectively.21
Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle must receive a
large portion of the credit for the successful passage of
the Bill.22 Even a cursory glance at the Congressional de
bates reveals that the two Maine legislators were the
chief sponsors and spokesmen for this naval legislation.23
Yet despite his enthusiastic advocacy of the Bill, Hale
felt that it was far too modest. The Senator did not in
tend for the Bill to be the last word in naval construction
legislation. During the heat of the debate he stated quite
frankly that the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1890 was
only a beginning. “All that is sought in this bill is to be
gin,” Hale contended, “and it is only a beginning. I say
frankly it is only a beginning. It is not intended to stop
here.”24
The Naval Appropriations Act of 1890 was undoubted
ly the most important naval legislation of the Harrison
administration. Naval appropriations in 1891 and 1892
provided for only one additional battleship, the Iowa,
and two cruisers, the Minneapolis and the Brooklyn.
Such appropriations were decidedly anti-climactic in
comparison with the 1890 measure. Despite this apparent
waning of New Navy enthusiasm, Hale and Boutelle con
tinued to promote the cause of naval regeneration with
vigor.

During the remainder of the Harrison administration
Senator Hale directed most of his remarks toward quiet
ing the fears of those who felt that the administration
had embarked on a policy designed to achieve naval par
190

ity with the big powers. In February 1891 Hale stated
that he did not believe that the nation needed, what he
termed, an “extravagant Navy.” He claimed that he
would be content with a relatively small but respectable
force composed of the very best ships in the world. In
fact, throughout these years the Senator was more con
cerned with the quality of the Navy than its quantity.25
In 1892, for example, he stated that the United States did
not need a reduplication of ships in such numbers as the
European powers. All that was essential was a naval
force capable of providing the country with safety and
protection from any fleet that potential adversaries
would be likely to send to our shores.26
Likewise, Congressman Boutelle continued his advo
cacy of the modern Navy in the latter years of the Harri
son administration. Due to Democratic victories in the
1890 election Boutelle was forced to relinquish his chair
manship of the Naval Affairs Committee. But as the com
mittee’s ranking minority member, he continued to exert
much influence on naval matters. Gone, however, was
the power that he once wielded. For instance, in 1892
Boutelle introduced an amendment to the naval bill of
that year which called for two new battleships, as op
posed to the one that the Naval Affairs Committee had
officially recommended. The Boutelle amendment was
defeated, and Congress authorized only one capital
ship.27 Increasingly, Boutelle became involved in debates
of a partisan political nature.
the records of our legislation shows [claimed Boutelle] that the
rebuilding of the Navy up to the present time is due to the votes of
the Republican party in this House, and has been accomplished at
every contested point in spite of the opposition of a majority of the
votes of the Democratic Representative.28

The Maine Congressman seemed as intent upon bestow
ing credit for what progress had been made in rebuild
ing the Navy upon the Republican party as he was in the
naval regeneration itself.
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Journalistic Support

Like the Maine Congressional delegation, Maine’s ma
jor newspapers favored the naval renaissance of the
Harrison administration. Numerous editorials supported
the New Navy cause consistently. The papers carried
literally hundreds of articles and news clips on nearly
every aspect of naval affairs: naval technology, foreign
naval developments, and the launching of the various ves
sels of the new United States Navy. For example, the
Bangor Daily Whig and Courier carried ten editorials and
articles on naval matters in the month of October 1889.
And in April 1890, while Congress debated the Naval Ap
propriations Bill, the paper printed nine ‘naval items’.
Portland’s Daily Eastern Argus not only reported faith
fully major naval developments and printed several edi
torials in support of the New Navy, but also carried de
tailed sketches of each major Navy vessel upon comple
tion.29

Such extensive journalistic coverage of naval affairs
and support for the New Navy was to be expected,
since most of the state’s major newspapers were staunch
ly pro-Republican (some having intimate connections
with prominent Republican politicians). Secretary of
State James G. Blaine had at one time owned a major in
terest in the Augusta newspaper, the Kennebec Journal.
None other than Congressman Charles Boutelle owned
controlling interest in the intensely partisan Bangor Daily
Whig and Courier.30 The Lewiston Evening Journal was
also a pro-Republican paper, most friendly to its favorite
son, Senator William Frye. Even the Democratic Daily
Eastern Argus was just as pro-Navy as the Republican pa
pers, differing only on points of method and procedure.31

All the papers agreed that the existing naval establish
ment was grossly inadequate. For example, the Lewis
ton Evening Journal in an 1890 editorial, entitled “Our
Navy To-Day”, noted the smallness and inefficiency of
the Navy and bemoaned the fact that the wooden ves192

seis were becoming unserviceable faster than new vessels
could be authorized and built.32 The Portland Argus a
year earlier took a similar stance: “The new warships
were being built none too soon, for the old ones are
rapidly losing the little value they ever had in compari
son with the modem armaments of other nations.”33 The
Argus also reprinted a Baltimore Sun editorial which ar
gued that several of the weaker naval powers had the po
tential to “swoop down upon us at any moment and
devastate the coast from Maine to Florida.” The same
editorial also depicted another hypothetical situation that
might be the result of naval unpreparedness: “a single
powerful iron-clad could levy upon our cities, within a
very few days . . . [great sums of money], leaving us
equally liable to another attack at any time. . . .”34

Once having noted the fact of the nation’s naval inade
quacy and having indicated some of the potentially dire
consequences of remaining in such a condition, the
Maine newspapers called for the rebuilding of the na
tion’s naval force to remedy the situation. The Argus
stated that although the nation was at peace, the United
States with its commercial and economic prosperity was
not without its potential rivals. The nation, therefore,
should go on with the work of rebuilding the Navy in ad
dition to strengthening the fortifications of prominent
coastal cities, Portland included.35 The Kennebec Journal
observed that the general sentiment of the American peo
ple favored a reasonable increase in the Navy. However,
the Journal reminded its readers that rebuilding the
Navy would take time due to the “magnitude and nature
of the work required in putting to sea such a fleet of war
vessels as the nation demands.”36 The 27 May 1890 issue
of the Kennebec Journal printed probably the most rep
resentative Maine editorial favoring the naval renais
sance. Echoing Senator Hale, the editorial stated that a
strong naval defense was essential to the preservation of
peace. The Journal remarked that in the event of a war
with Britain, the chief naval power of the nineteenth cen
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tury, the “utterly defenceless” American commerce
would be swept from the seas. The editorial concluded
by noting that “the people of Maine, with its more than
2,000 miles of coast should for obvious reasons be inter
ested in the building up of a strong navy by the general
government. . . .”37

Maine’s major newspapers were in unison in their advo
cacy of a stronger naval arm. But there were differences
which were roughly manifested along partisan political
lines. Yet the newspapers generally did not equate the
cause of naval expansion with any particular party. Bou
telle s Bangor Daily Whig and Courier was the most signi
ficant exception to this general rule. Repeatedly, the Ban
gor paper accused the Democratic party with obstruct
ing naval progress. It attributed most, if not all, the suc
cess in rebuilding the Navy to the Republican party. In
April 1890 the Bangor Whig reprinted a Cincinnati editor
ial which stated that the Democrats’ failure to sustain the
nation’s maritime prowess “should incite Republican zeal
in behalf of that branch of our military service that has
shed so much glory upon our country and its flag.”38 A
reprinted Philadelphia editorial, “How the Navy was
Built”, attributed current naval construction to the will
ingness of Republican Congressmen to allot funds to the
naval program and stated that if the Republican Senate
had taken the course of the Democratic House in Cleve
land’s first administration, there would be no New Navy
at all.39 Just after Congress defeated Boutelle’s amend
ment to the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1892, the Ban
gor Whig alleged that the Democrats, with their “unpa
triotic and sectional instincts”, had checked the progress
of naval construction, leaving the “rich seaboard cities of
the United States without adequate defence from hostile
attack.”40
The Bangor Whig generously publicized the contribu
tions made by its owner, Representative Boutelle, on be
half of the New Navy. When Boutelle was appointed
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Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, the
Whig printed four items from other newspapers which
heaped lavish praise on the Maine Congressman.41 Boutelle’s newspaper reprinted a New York Tribune editor
ial that said Congressman Boutelle “deserves great credit
for the industry and success with which he has conduct
ed .. . [the Naval Affairs Committee’s] investiga
tions. . . .” The Whig also printed a letter written by
Congressman J.P. Dolliver, an Iowa Republican, which
contended that “the country is first of all indebted to the
well trained foresight and practical wisdom of Chairman
Boutelle” for the passage of the Naval Appropriations
Bill of 1890. Many more instances of this type of
‘pat-on-the-back’ journalism were evidenced in the pages
of the Bangor Whig. Undoubtedly, the Maine citizen
who read solely this paper would conclude that Charles
Boutelle single-handedly brought about the naval regene
ration and, thereby, saved the nation.

Maine citizens were exposed to the New Navy cause
in ways other than newspaper editorials and reprinted
speeches of their Congressmen. Portlanders, for instance,
packed a local theater in December 1892 to see “A.Y.
Pearson’s Big Patriotic and Spectacular Drama, ‘The
White Squadron.’ ” The Eastern Argus carried elaborate
advertisements, complete with a large picture of a mod
em cruiser of the famous White Squadron. The Argus re
view of the play described immense crowds and thunder
ous ovations at the “emphatically patriotic drama.”42 Resi
dents of the Bangor-Bar Harbor area, however, had the
opportunity to view the real thing in late August 1891.
The United States Navy staged its spectacular grand na
val review off Bar Harbor. The highlight of the review
was a mock naval battle between the White Squadron
and the North Atlantic Squadron. All told, ten of the
Navy’s best cruisers participated. Secretary Tracy head
ed the list of dignitaries present to witness the gala af
fair. Congressman Boutelle dramatically arrived at Bar
Harbor in the new cruiser Vesuvius to join the festivities,
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while many other Bangor inhabitants took special excur
sion trains to the coast.43
Naval Construction
The state of Maine was able to achieve tangible eco
nomic benefits from the New Navy agitation of the Har
rison administration, namely contracts to build three na
val vessels at Bath Iron Works. In early August 1889 a
representative of Secretary Tracy inspected the new
ly-founded Bath Iron Works in order to ascertain whe
ther the institution could serve as a nucleus for a govern
ment naval station (a base where steel vessels could be
both constructed and repaired). Although the representa
tive announced that he was favorably impressed with the
new firm and the town of Bath, for some reason the na
val station was established elsewhere.44 Less than a
month later Bath was host to President Harrison and Sec
retary Tracy along with most of the Maine Congressional
delegation. Harrison and Tracy spent the better part of a
day inspecting the town’s shipbuilding plants, especially
Bath Iron Works.45 In November of that same year the
Bath firm made an unsuccessful bid on a cruiser con
tract. But this did not dampen the spirits of the Bath peo
ple, as a Bath Times editorial indicated:
Bath will keep a-bidding till she gets iron ships to build. There is no
doubt about that. The future is destined to see a good many iron
ships constructed in America, and Bath is to have her share.46

Finally in late February 1890 the optimistic predictions
were realized when Bath Iron Works was awarded its
first contracts for two steel gunboats at a price of
$318,500 apiece.47 The gunboats were hybrid vessels with
both steam and sail propulsion. They were lightly ar
mored craft of about one thousand tons displacement,
sporting six four-inch breech-loading rifles for their main
armament.48 Amid much fanfare the first gunboat was
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launched on 8 December 1891, christened by Ethel
Hyde, daughter of General Hyde, the President of Bath
Iron Works. She was named the Machias in honor of the
first naval engagement of the War for American Indepen
dence. The Machias’ sistership, the Castine, was
launched on 10 May 1892. The two gunboats were the
first steel warships ever to be built in the state of Maine.49
The Lewiston Journal saw in the two gunboat con
tracts the seeds of a permanent steel shipbuilding indus
try in Maine, an industry that had the potential of becom
ing one of the state’s leading employers: “Steadily, sure
ly, Maine is moving ahead. A great industrial future is be
fore her.”50 Although these words are somewhat prophe
tic, the prophecy was not fulfilled during the Harrison
administration. The Bath Works continued to bid for
Navy contracts. In July 1891 the firm made the lowest
bid on a proposed fast cruiser but lost the contract to the
well-established Philadelphia firm of Cramp and Sons,
which was already building an exact duplicate of the
cruiser. Bath admitted that it could not complete the
ship within the two year contract limit, whereas Cramp
and Sons claimed they could build it in six months less
time. In addition, the difficulty of constructing the pro
posed vessel made Navy Department officials wary of
awarding the contract to the new and relatively inexper
ienced firm.51 Yet the Iron Works’ low bid not only
forced Cramp and Sons to lower their first bid but also
gained for the firm a national reputation as a builder of
large warships of exceptional speed competitive with the
famous Philadelphia concern 52 Bath Iron Works received
only one additional contract during the Harrison adminis
tration. It was for the experimental L7.S.S. Katahdin, a
low-lying, cigar-shaped vessel armed only with a massive
pointed ram. The unique vessel was never imitated.53

The Chilean Affair: A New Navy Vindication

During the Harrison administration an actual diploma
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tic crisis developed from which the naval expansionists,
heretofore using theoretical and hypothetical arguments,
claimed that their efforts for naval regeneration had
been vindicated. On 16 October 1891 two American blue
jackets were killed and sixteen injured during a street
brawl in Valparaiso, Chile. Secretary of State Blaine, un
willing to jeopardize his Pan-American and reciprocity
policies, was inclined to treat the incident as of minor sig
nificance.54 President Harrison, however, regarded the in
cident as an attack of grave importance. In late Decem
ber and early January after much diplomatic maneuver
ing, the situation became quite serious. Chilean naval
forces held naval exercises in Valparaiso harbor, using
the anchored American cruiser Yorktown as a target for
mock torpedo boat attacks. War preparations were made
in both countries, and by mid-January a conflict seemed
inevitable. Matters came to a head on 21 January 1892
when Blaine sent an ultimatum, xvorded by Harrison, to
the Chileans demanding an apology and reparations.
Five days later the Chilean government sent an apology;
reparations followed subsequently.55 The United States
had come ever so close to a naval conflict with Chile, a
small, but by no means, insignificant naval power.
Maine’s two foremost naval advocates, Senator Hale
and Congressman Boutelle, did not fail to cite the Chil
ean affair as a vindication of their naval expansion argu
ments. In an interview with a New York newspaper cor
respondent during the height of the crisis, Senator Hale
was asked what would have been the result of the cur
rent dispute with Chile had the United States no navy
“to back up our demands for a proper course of con
duct.” Hale replied that were the Navy in the state it
was a few years before, “Chile could have blustered at us
as much as she pleased and we would have been power
less to say a word.” The Maine Senator again raised the
specter of hostile ships bombarding helpless American
cities. Hale concluded by stating that the Chilean affair
to date had confirmed his belief in the necessity of a
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strong navy. “I think our people appreciate this fact”, he
claimed, “and I believe they all rejoice that we are now
in a position to assert our national self respect.”56
In Congress Senator Hale reiterated his belief that the
recent steps toward rebuilding the Navy had saved the
country from profound embarrassment during the Chil
ean crisis. The New Navy had spared the nation the hu
miliation of being “bully-ragged by a little South Ameri
can power . . [, for Chile] would have had its hand at
our throats and we would have been at its mercy.” He
ended his speech by warning that the nation could ex
pect similar incidents and must, therefore, be prepared:
We are coming nearer to other people, forming commercial alliances,
and entanglements
may come about at any time We can not
count upon that exemption from trouble, danger, and war [that] we
have been counting upon for the last twenty-five years.57

Likewise, Congressman Boutelle did not miss the op
portunity to draw conclusions from the Chilean affair.
He viewed the crisis as “a demonstration of the incalcul
able benefit conferred upon this country by the develop
ment of our Navy. . . .” Boutelle maintained that had
the nation been in the state of naval unpreparedness of
several years before, San Francisco might have been
bombarded or New York “might have been put under
tribute or partially destroyed by so comparatively insigni
ficant a power as Chile.” But the United States, Boutelle
proclaimed, did have the nucleus of a modern navy. Sec
retary Tracy was able “by the click of the telegraph .
[to] set in motion .
a naval force under the flag of
our country adequate to the maintenance of the dignity
of and honor of the United States . . .”58 Boutelle, like
Hale, did not favor a retreat from American commercial
expansion in foreign nations in order to minimize the pos
sibility of similar incidents occurring in the future. Ra
ther, he advocated an adequate naval establishment to
protect and uphold American citizens and interest
abroad.59
Maine’s

Republican

newspapers
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wholeheartedly

agreed with Harrison’s handling of the Chilean affair.
But only the Kennebec Journal actually linked the events
of the incident with the New Navy cause. In an editorial,
entitled “The Lesson of the Chilean Affair”, the Journal
noted, in words nearly identical to those of Hale and
Boutelle, that without the New Navy Chile easily could
have “laid low” the nation’s coastal cities. Sounding very
much like Boutelle’s Bangor Whig, the Augusta paper
took this opportunity7 to strike out against the Democrats:
“If the peanut statesmen of the Democratic party had
continued in uninterrupted power to the present day the
United States would not have been in position to have
demanded apology and reparation. . .
The editorial
concluded by citing the Chilean affair as ample justifica
tion for “energetically pushing forward the work of
building up our new navy.”60

Unlike the Republican newspapers, the Portland East
ern Argus violently opposed the Harrison administra
tion’s handling of the Chilean crisis. While other Maine
newspapers demanded that America resort to war should
the Chileans refuse to apologize and make reparations,
the Argus argued that war was both not in the nation’s
best interest and morally unjustifiable. A war with Chile,
the Argus maintained, would involve the United States in
complications with Britain and hence expose American
shipping and coastal cities to the over-powering might of
the Royal Navy. A war with Chile would also discredit
the nation in the eyes of many of the South American re
publics, to the benefit of the country’s European rivals.
The Argus also attacked the view that war was in the
people’s interest. On the contrary, protested the Argus,
the people are invariably “the chief sufferers” in war.
The nation simply was not justified in going to war over
“a drunken sailors’ brawl.”61

When the Chilean crisis passed, the Republican news
papers of Maine praised the administration’s tough stand.
One even noted the relationship of the naval renaissance
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with aggressive, even
ing a sigh of relief at
the Eastern Argus, on
Fitz Nigel, “No War
read as follows:

belligerent, foreign policy. Breath
the news of a peaceful settlement,
the other hand, printed a poem by
with Chile”, one stanza of which

Yes, by jingo!
I know you’re all
Cocked and primed
For a row
And that’s what’s the matter.
The big guns, big ships,
Devlish torpedoes,
Patent armor plates, etc.,
Have turned your head
Also the little heads
Of the little naval roosters
Who want to be Admirals
But we shan’t have no war

62

Maine and the New Navy, 1889-1893
During the Harrison administration the state of Maine
almost unanimously supported the New Navy. Only one
example of opposition to the cause of rebuilding the
Navy has been found. The North Berwick Society of
Friends meeting petitioned the Fifty-first Congress
against increased expenditures for naval construction and
coast defense.63 Such sentiment was most rare, for the
state was intimately involved in the naval revival.
Maine’s Congressional delegation not only supported
New Navy legislation, but also provided the cause with
its national leadership. The great significance of the Na
val Appropriations Act of 1890 for the future develop
ment of the Navy underlines the importance of the role
played by Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle.
Maine’s major newspapers supported naval expansion
and, no doubt, created or reinforced considerable pro-na
val sentiment in their readers. The state of Maine, in ad
dition to its contributions to the legislative and popular
roots of the modem American naval arm, also contri
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buted three new ships to the growing list of commis
sioned vessels in the United States Navy. And, as the
Chilean episode demonstrated, the state of Maine, on the
whole, linked the New Navy with the strategic impera
tives of an emerging world power.
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